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Chapter 10

Prof1les in American Thomism
Marc Guerra
John Courtney Murray observed that one ofthe enduring political tasks ofAmerican
Thomism is to defend the kind of "realist epistemology'' that grounds liberal
democratic thought. 1 As an American and as a Catholic, Murray had a healthy
appreciation of the ''political goods" articulated by what he called the "American
proposition. " 2 Murray praised American democracy for upholding such goods as
the basic equality ofhuman beings, the defense of religious freedom, the belief that
legitimate government must respect the consent of the governed, and the belief that
human beings are endowed by the Creator with rights that limit the exercise of
popular sovereignty. The American proposition was, then, worth defending
precisely because it gave powerful political expression to the moral and spiritual
truth about human beings. But Murray also believed that there was something
potentially self-destructive about the way in which the notions of freedom and truth
could be understood in America. Murray saw in the more rationalistic formulations
of the writings of the American founding a tendency to "obscure" human freedom's
constitutive relation to transcendent moral truth. This is why, Murray believed,
Thomism would have to be able to defend a realist epistemology, since only a
realist epistemology could explain the grounds of the genuine human goods upheld
by the American proposition.
Murray then did not view the temptation to divorce human freedom from the
notion of truth as a recent innovation in American moral and political thought.
Rather than simply seeing this temptation as an outgrowth ofthe radical liberationist
ideologies of the 1960s, he saw it as "a possibility ... inherent from [America's]
beginning."3 Murray identified a tension in the political science of the American
Founding between "a voluntarist idea oflaw as will" and "a tradition of natural law
as inheritance [as an] intellectualist idea." 4 In Murray's reading, the political
thought of the American Founding thus stood in constant need of internal
moderation. It continually needed to be reminded of the fact that the truths

I
I
i

I

I

126

Marc Guerra

contained in the American proposition were ultimately grounded in a "realist"
anthropology and natural law. By broadening and deepening what was true about
the American proposition, in other words, Thomistic realism could show that the
Founders, to use Murray's famous phrase, "built better than they knew." 5
Murray developed this argument along two lines. On the one hand, he turned to
those supports that could be found for democratic government in the works of St.
Thomas. To this end, Murray drew upon St. Thomas' teachings on the social and
political nature of man, the importance and integrity of the common good, and the
role that virtue and morality play in political life. But Murray reali7.ed that the
soundness of these teachings finally depended upon the persuasiveness of more
''metaphysical" and ''theological" arguments about the nature and dignity ofhuman
beings. Along these lines, he set out to recover the kind of robust philosophical
anthropology that informed St. Thomas' thought. Over and against the
dehumanizing anthropology ofearly modem political philosophy, Thomism did not
require "a basic betrayal ofthe existential structure ofreality itself.''6 Consequently,
it could affirm the rational, spiritual, and social nature of human beings and draw
attention to the range of social, political, and spiritual goods that add to the true
dignity of human life. By taking seriously what we reasonably can know about
human beings, Murray argued, Thomism simultaneously was able to affirm both the
naturalness of social and political life and what is ultimately transcendent about
human life.
Perhaps no contemporary thinkers take the political challenge of American
Thomism more seriously than Robert P. George and Peter Augustine Lawler.
George and Lawler both identify themselves as American Thomists, albeit Thomists
of differing and rather idiosyncratic types. Each shares an appreciation of the
goodness of the American regime and of the account of human beings given by
Christian revelation. Moreover, in recent years, both have published books,
George's The Clash ofOrthodoxies and Lawler's Aliens in America, that argue that
Thomism finally gives the fullest account of the moral, political, and spiritual
aspirations inherent in the American proposition.7
But despite these similarities, George and Lawler occupy two distinct positions
within Thomistic political thought. While George and Lawler both argue that
Thomism can help sustain democratic thought, they disagree about Christianity's
fundamental relation to liberal democracy. Moving well beyond the boundaries of
Murray's argument, George argues that the liberalism of the American Founding is
for the most part "fully in line" with the "old-fashioned Liberalism" championed by
"John Paul II and the contemporary Catholic Church."8 Lawler, on the other hand,
remains more skeptical about the "full" compatibility of Christianity and liberal
democracy, seeing their reconciliation as being more prudential and theoretical.
The disagreement between George and Lawler on this point draws attention to an
internal tension in contemporary Thomistic political thought. For in its more
thoughtful presentations, American Thomism is split over the fundamental relation
of Christianity to liberal democracy. George and Lawler's works offer particularly
illuminating examples of this split. As we shall see, their arguments on this matter
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reveal as much about their understandings of Thomism as they do about their
seriousness as political thinkers.

Robert George's Old-Fashioned Catholic Liberalism
Robert George is arguably America's most prominent natural law theorist. Professor
of Jurisprudence and director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals
and Institutions at Princeton University, George's thought is marked by an
uncompromising and at times maddening desire for moral and theoretical clarity.
Contrary to the obfuscating tendencies of so much of present-day ethical and legal
theory, George's writings display both the logical rigor ofanalytical philosophy and
the moral seriousness of natural law theory. The arguments George presents in The
Clash ofOrthodoxies about the relation of Christianity to liberal democracy are no
exception to this rule.
George sets his discussion of Christianity's relation to liberal democracy in a
series of reflections on the often "clashing" moral orthodoxies at the heart of
today's "culture wars." George views the contemporary culture wars not simply as
a debate between two different moral codes but rather as a fight over the very nature
of morality itself. It is a war, in George's view, between those who adhere to
traditional biblical teachings on morality and those secular "liberationists" who
deny the validity of any and all moral codes.
Today's moral liberationists, as George shows, believe that human beings are
fundamentally autonomous moral agents. Consequently, they see human beings as
essentially free from all but the most minimal moral and political restraints. George
traces the intellectual origins of this radically libertarian view of human freedom
back to the powerful doctrines of moral relativism that came to animate the thought
of mainstream social science in the 1960s. Such thought claimed to have
scientifically "discovered" that moral codes were ultimately the product of a series
of historical and cultural prejudices and that all moral teachings were in truth
arbitrary and conventional. Having severed any principled connection between
human freedom and transcendent moral truth, it championed a view of human
beings as radically autonomous moral agents whose personal dignity required
nothing less than the full exercise of human freedom. George sees this ideology as
lying behind what have now come to be viewed as such mainstream social and
moral orthodoxies as "feminism, multiculturalism, gay liberationism, [and] lifestyle
liberalism. " 9
But as George argues, the secularist moral orthodoxy is in the end built on a
series of questionable dogmatic assertions. Chief among these is its denial of any
transcendent moral order. For the argument it advanced is only defensible if one
accepts the radical claim that reason is in fact incapable ofknowing any moral truth,
that human beings really know nothing about the basic structure of the moral
universe. Conflating the claim to moral truth with the claim to complete or perfect
moral knowledge, it transforms moral truth from something that reason "discovers"
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by reflecting on the moral contents ofhuman life into something that the human will
"creates or expresses." As a result, it inevitably reduces all moral questions simply
to matters of personal or volitional consent. And yet, by so doing, this radical view
of human liberty, George demonstrates, renders itself theoretically indefensible.
For by allegedly liberating human beings from all types of moral claims, it makes
it impossible to explain the legitimacy of any of the various things the human will
desires. The claim to radical moral autonomy, in other words, is thus theoretically
incapable of explaining why human goods are desirable. Indeed, within its
framework, the very idea ofany human good, let alone those political goods secured
by liberal democracy, necessarily becomes unintelligible.
Over and against secular orthodoxy's perverted view of human liberty, George
champions the notion of "ordered liberty" present in the thought of the American
Founders and currently defended by the Catholic Church. This view of human
liberty, George argues, is capable of affirming the genuine human goods upheld by
liberal democracy precisely because it realizes that authentic human freedom is
finally grounded in a transcendent moral order. It is therefore a mistake to see
George's powerful critique of the libertarian excesses of today's reigning secular
orthodoxy as being rooted in a politically conservative hostility toward liberal
democracy. On the contrary, George is an articulate and staunch defender of the
goodness and desirability ofliberal democracy. He praises liberal democracy for its
ability to secure such things as the rule of law, the political participation of free
individuals, and the promotion of human rights. Moreover, siding with the thought
of Pope John Paul II, George ultimately believes that liberal democracy is "the
system of government most in keeping with the fundamental Christian belief in the
equality in human rights and dignity of every human being. " 10
George recognizes that the Roman Catholic Church historically has not always
embraced liberal democracy. Indeed, much of the Catholic Church's moral and
political thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was characterized by its
religious critique of liberalism. George is also aware that even ''today, certain
Catholic conservatives-the sort of conservatives who are decidedly not what I am
calling old-fashioned liberal--r'emain suspicious ... as to whether democratic
political principles are compatible with Catholic faith." 11 The so-called Catholic
conservatives George here speaks about are in truth both a theologically and
politically diverse group. In America, for instance, this group would include current
Catholic thinkers that are as intellectually diverse as the theologian David Schindler
and the political scientist Robert Kraynak. What such Catholic conservatives have
in common, however, is the beliefthat on the level of principle there are important
differences between liberal democracy's and Christianity's teachings about human
beings and human liberty.
In George's view, such conservative Catholics, however, typically make the
mistake of basing their understanding ofliberalism exclusively on the kind of antiChristian and anticlassical thought that animated the actions of the French
revolutionaries. This strand of liberalism clearly advocated the kind of ''moral and
religious subjectivism, relativism, and indiffertism" that George sees as being
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inimical to the tenets of the Catholic faith. 12 But this is not the only current in
modem liberalism as George points out. What conservative critics ofliberalism too
often fail to see, George argues, is that there are other, healthier strands of
liberalism "developed largely by British and American thinkers and manifested in
the words and deeds of the American Founders" that do not pose the same type of
fundamental objections to Christian faith. 13
While George does not here explicitly address the teachings of early modem
political philosophy that ground this other "healthier form" ofliberalism, he briefly
touches upon them in his discussion of the central political role that individual
rights play within liberal democracy. Such rights, he observes, are in fact "central
to" this tradition ofliberal democracy. But what separates the Anglo-American view
of rights from its French counterpart is that it integrates the idea of individual
human rights into a broader understanding of human beings as participants in a
created order that itselfreveals the moral structure ofthe universe. Far from viewing
human beings as radically autonomous moral beings, this conception of "ordered
liberty" tethers human liberty to transcendent moral truth. By so doing, it then
severely limits radical libertarianism's efforts to view human beings as "atomistic"
individuals that possess a ''right" to moral subjectivism. 14 The conception of rights
that is then operative in the kind of Catholic liberalism that George advocates and
claims is fully in line with the liberalism of the American Founding is thus one that
grows out of an earlier tradition of natural law. Indeed, as George repeatedly
asserts, within this type ofliberal order human beings possess duties proscribed to
them by the natural law in addition to the rights that flow from these prior duties. 15
The fundamental question that George's account raises, however, but finally does
not adequately address, is whether this alternative, healthier form of liberalism
really has no principled connection to the other form of liberalism that George
himself admits is incompatible with the moral and spiritual demands of Christian
faith. Put differently, George's reflection does not finally address the question of
whether or not the philosophy of liberalism, even in its Anglo-American
presentation, does not necessarily require viewing human beings as being in some
important respect free from all natural and divine restraints. Truth be told, George
indirectly recognizes this problem. He notes, for example, that ''reasonable people"
can, and in fact do, question whether modernity's very idea of individual rights does
not ultimately contain the theoretical seed oflibertarianism' s radical view ofhuman
freedom. Along similar lines, he notes that when used properly, that is carefully, the
"language of rights" is "of great value in articulating the requirements of social
justice" in liberal democratic regimes. 16 But such acknowledgments ofthe important
need to qualify liberal thought in the end only begs the question further: Are the two
kinds ofliberalism George describes truly unrelated? Is the philosophic liberalism
of the American Founders entirely different from the liberalism of the French
revolutionaries? And if it is not, what then does this say about how Thomistic
political thought should address the question of the theoretical relation of
Christianity and liberal democracy? These are in the final analysis philosophical
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questions that George's political reflection on the old-fashioned liberalism of the
Catholic Church is incapable of answering.

Peter Lawler's Decision for Natural Law
Peter Lawler is one of the most thoughtful and for that reason original Christian
political thinkers writing today. A prolific writer, Lawler has written on subjects as
seemingly diverse as the threat biotechnology poses to human dignity to the
Christian undertones of the film The Last Days ofDisco. Yet almost all ofLawler's
writings are born out of a common intellectual concern: the need for modem human
beings to come to terms with what Pascal called the "greatness and misery of man."
Lawler's The Restless Mind (1993), for example, examined how Tocqueville's
defense ofliberalism was in part motivated by his admiration of the "greatness and
misery of the self-conscious mortal being." Similarly, his Postmodernism Rightly
Understood (1999) argued that contemporary skepticism about, and dissatisfaction
with, modernity ironically paved the way for a much-needed return to the kind of
Thomistic-Pascalian realism practiced by thinkers like the Southern Catholicnovelist-psychiatrist-philosopher Walker Percy.
Lawler's Aliens in America takes advantage of the opening that postmodern
thought gives to a return to Thomistic realism. At the heart of this book lies a deep
reflection on both what it means to be a human being and what modem liberalism,
particularly in its American presentation, says human beings are. And yet it is
precisely because Lawler engages in this serious philosophical reflection on the
nature of modem liberalism that he is able to show why natural law thinking finally
offers the best available account of the nature of human freedom and of our natural
and ineradicable longings for the eternal. Simply put, this serious work ofThomistic
political reflection offers a substantive and compelling account of what such a
return to "Thomistic realism" actually has to offer American political thought today.
As Lawler shows, the American Founding was in some sense a philosophic act,
or at least an act performed by the philosophically informed. And the central
philosophic player in the act was Thomas Jefferson. While clearly indebted to
Locke's political and philosophical teachings, Lawler's Jefferson is not simply a
dyed-in-the-wool Lockean. Rather, Lawler brings to light the fact that Jefferson was
a rather eclectic and original thinker who combined Lockean, Epicurean, and
Christian elements in his thought. Like Locke, Jefferson also understood the modem
liberal regime as being founded on a great philosophic abstraction: the rightsbearing individual. For Jefferson's political liberalism, like Locke's, also, sought
to secure for human beings living in civil society the full realm of freedom they
supposedly possessed in "the state ofnature." Appealing to man's original freedom
from all natural and divine restraints, he developed a notion ofrights that saw man's
freedom as more fundamental to his being than any artificial social, political, or
religious association.
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This appeal to the "primordial" freedom man enjoyed in the state of nature,
Lawler notes, had the effect of changing the very way that human beings tended to
view themselves and the world. For inasmuch as they understood themselves most
fully as individuals, human beings would henceforth be inclined to see the security
of rights, which did not come from "God or nature but by human beings themselves
when they institute government," as being "the really valuable thing." 17 They would
thus tend to view all human actions and ties as "matters of consent" and all forms
of "government as . . . human constructs" designed to satisfy man's allencompassing "desire for safety." 18 As Lawler points out, to the extent that it was
truly effective, Jefferson's notion of rights perpetuated Locke's view ofhuman life
as "a tale of self-liberation in the absence of a living, and giving God" and a quest
to secure the security and comfort that made human life worth living. 19 Unlike
George, in other words, Lawler does see in Jefferson's philosophical teaching on
individual rights some of the theoretical seeds for today's libertarianism. For at the
theoretical core of Jefferson's idea of individual rights, lies the image of human
beings who are naturally free to construct the moral and political universe.
But as Lawler shows, Jefferson also understood that there was something both
politically deficient and existentially untenable about this teaching. Jefferson
recognized that left on its own, the doctrine of the rights-bearing individual was
theoretically incapable of explaining why such radically free individuals would
understand themselves as having any social and political obligation to others. The
realiz.ation of this fact, in Lawler's view, is what prompted Jefferson to tum to
Christianity's moral teaching about human beings' social obligations to others. Yet
Lawler does not believe that this turn was simply rhetorical or that it was purely
motivated by political utility. Drawing on Jefferson's correspondence with
Benjamin Rush, Lawler sheds light on the sincerity of Jefferson's beliefthat human
beings really do have moral and social obligations to other human beings. Jefferson
thus turned to a despiritualized version of Christianity's moral teaching, in other
words, because he realized that there was something lacking in philosophic
liberalism's account of the lived experience of human life.
Lawler interestingly traces the roots of this tension in Jefferson's thought back to
his attraction to the teachings of the ancient Epicurean philosophers. In so doing,
Lawler draws attention to the Epicurean resonances that lie at the heart of modern
liberalism's account of human beings. Like Epicureanism, philosophic liberalism
also claims that human beings are most naturally asocial beings and that moral and
political life is at bottom unnatural. What is more, both see the enjoyment ofhuman
happiness as being most properly a private affair, a form of tranquility that comes
from a type of "happiness" that man constructs and enjoys by himself. Yet the two
ultimately differ over whether or not this happiness is truly obtainable for human
beings. The classical Epicureans clearly believed that it could. Their modem
counterparts like Jefferson, Lawler suggests, are far less certain ofthis fact. Having
been touched by modernity's claim ofhuman beings' relative isolation in the world,
they felt the ''uneasiness" that comes from this sensation more deeply than the
ancient Epicureans. As Lawler puts it, "the real human experience at the end of the
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destructiveness of the modem era is a spiritual vacuum at the heart of human
existence."20 Taken seriously, the creative but false anthropology championed by
philosophic liberalism makes it "impossible for human beings to experience
themselves as reasonable, happy, or secure."
In Lawler's view, ''the best" and "most reasonable" alternative to philosophic
liberalism's reductionist account of human beings and political life can be found in
the robust kind of natural law reinterpretation of the American Founding given by
the Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray. Lawler's reasons for advocating
such a return are twofold: (1) modem human beings need a theoretically coherent
way ofresponding to today's increasingly "destructive mixture oflibertarianism and
technology'' and (2) ''most human beings can live well, even better, in light of the
truth about themselves." Lawler, like Murray, recognizes that the philosophical
anthropologies that liberal democracies such as America rely upon ultimately do not
articulate a single, coherent account of human beings and human life. Rather, they
typically employ what Walker Percy called a "mishmash" anthropology, a
politically useful, but theoretically incoherent, account of human beings that
combines incompatible rationalistic and theological elements. The virtue of this
mishmash anthropology, as Lawler subtly shows, however is that its theoretical
incoherence provides a ''prudential" opening for the "reductionist" elements of
philosophic liberalism to be broadened and deepened by natlll'al law thinking.
Following Murray, Lawler also offers a reinterpretation of the Founding along
natural law lines. For Lawler, the reductionist elements present in the writings ofthe
Founding are then best understood not as wholesale rejections but rather as
truncated modifications of America's Christian natural law inheritance. Lawler
consequently views the moral and theoretical reductionism that characterizes some
of the Founders' thought as the result of a self-imposed philosophical narrowness
that was adopted for the sake of political expediency. By placing such elements
within the framework of natural law, it is possible to see how they help explain the
moral and political grounds for democratic self-rule as well as human beings'
natural moral and social desires to "know and love other human beings and God."
Lawler therefore sees the primary crisis that confronts liberal democracies such
as America as being theoretical in nature. Indeed, as his subtle analysis of
Jefferson's thought points out, what liberal democracy lacks but needs most is an
account of human beings and the world that can actually make sense of the genuine
moral and spiritual goods that it politically secures. Natural law thinking provides
just such an account. By acknowledging a moral order that is finally not of man's
making and ''the sovereignty of God over nations as well as individuals," natural
law is capable of giving political life its "fundamental human meaning."21 Viewed
in this context, the tum to natural law that Lawler advocates is really seen to be part
of a broader return to a distinctively Christian tradition that the architects ofmodem
liberalism may have misunderstood and distorted, but ultimately helped perpetuate.
However, for Lawler the return to natural law thinking ultimately requires a prior,
''metaphysical decision" for natural law. That is, the return to natural law cannot
simply take the form of a more or less willful assertion of a preference for a
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politically useful conception of a fixed moral order. In sharp contrast to other
contemporary Thomists like Germain Grisez and John Finnis who advocate a tum
to a largely metaphysically neutral natural law, Lawler defends the decision for
natural law because natural law articulates what we know to be metaphysically true
about human beings. The "foundation of the natural law tradition" thus rests on
human beings' natural and moral "apprehension that human freedom is limited [and
ordered] by God's sovereignty."22
Lawler's metaphysical decision for natural law is then finally not a willful
existentialist decision/or order over moral chaos. On the contrary, it is most deeply
a decision that the human goods and moral order articulated by the natural most
reasonably corresponds to what we actually know about human beings and the
universe in which they live. Lawler, like Murray, thus "decides" in favor of natural
law because it corresponds to the truths about human beings and human life that are
disclosed through a realist epistemology. For what natural law in fact points to is
that human beings are ultimately and in some mysterious way moral, political,
social, and spiritual beings. They are beings that take part in the genuine goods of
the human world but at the same time beings that long for something eternal that
transcends this world. Or as Lawler puts it, what the realism ofnatural law truthfully
reveals is that human beings are "the beast with the angel inside" and as such they
can never be more than "ambiguously at home in this world." And for this reason,
Lawler maintains, the metaphysical decision for natural law "deserves to prevail
over rival doctrines on empirical grounds alone. " 23
In advocating a return to natural law thinking, Lawler thus goes a long way to
developing precisely the kind of rich philosophical anthropology that Pope John
Paul II argues is lacking in contemporary thought. Pope John Paul concludes his
powerful defense of the dignity of human reason and the interdependence of faith
and reason in his encyclicalFides et Ratio by noting that what modem liberal moral
and political thought most noticeably lacks is "a philosophical anthropology and a
metaphysics of the good."24 Having slowly lost an appreciation of the variegated
goods of human life that this kind of anthropology and metaphysic is capable of
articulating, liberal moral and political thought characteristically takes refuge in an
"ethic" that is finally either "subjectivist" or ''utilitarian."25 Natural law thinkers
such as Lawler, however, clearly do not follow this well-beaten path. Indeed, to the
extent that they approach such "ethical" questions from within the theoretical
context ofnatural law, their moral and political reflections on specific questions are
able to shed a light on what is truly good and desirable about human life.
Lawler's natural law approach is especially adept at drawing attention to the
reductionist and finally dehumanizing view ofhuman beings that animates so much
of today's discussion, on both the right and the left, about the problem of
biotechnology. Lawler is clearly no Luddite. He is too thoughtful and too much a
partisan of human physical and psychic well-being to be numbered among those
critics who characteristically oppose every and all biotechnological advancement.
At the same time, he realizes that biotechnology's increased ability to biologically
alter our minds and human nature poses a real, fundamental threat to our dignity as
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human beings. Lawler thus sees the burgeoning biotech revolution as something of
a mixed blessing. He soberly looks forward to ''the good" that new biotechnologies
will undoubtedly do by allowing many of us to live longer and healthier lives. Yet,
with equal sobriety, he also worries that some of the emerging biotechnologies in
neuroscience and psychopharmacology will alterthe very way that we perceive and
experience human life.
The kind of natural law approach that Lawler takes to questions ofbiotechnology
is then acutely aware of the all-too-human costs we could impose on ourselves
through our use of biotechnologies. It weighs the human worth of specific
biotechnological advancements not in terms ofthe "rights" ofhuman self-ownership
or the degree to which they contribute to a "culture of death," but rather whether
they contribute to what C. S. Lewis aptly called ''the abolition of man."26
Recognizing that human beings are more than mere bodily beings, natural law
thinking is capable of explaining why the belief that physical health is the greatest
good inevitably runs the risk of sacrificing the moral and spiritual goods that make
our lives both distinctively human and genuinely worth living. 27 Simply put, for
natural law thinkers like Lawler, the real danger that an unfettered acceptance and
use of biotechnology poses is that it makes all-too-real the possibility for us to
intentionally and perversely choose to flatten our souls by "surrendering" the
genuine good of "human self-consciousness" to the supposedly unqualified benefits
of physical and psychic "comfort."28
Natural law thinkers like Lawler, in other words, understand that to do justice to
what is really morally and politically good for human beings it is necessary to
appreciate, if even only imperfectly, the variety of legitimate but competing goods
that all contribute to the true dignity of human life. The curious thing about human
self-consciousness, as C. S. Lewis pointed out, is that it requires us to acknowledge
''the law which is peculiar to [our] nature, the law [we do] not share with animals
or vegetables or inorganic things, ... the one [we] can disobey if [we] chose."29
And as Lewis also noted, this acknowledgment initially should give us "cause to be
uneasy." For it requires us to come to terms with the initially uncomfortable truth
that there is only "one case" in the visible universe where this "dismay[ing]" fact
applies, "our own case."30
Philosophical natural law thinkers like Lawler therefore remind modem human
beings of an important, if increasingly untimely, truth. Employing a "realist
epistemology," they resist the modem temptation, indulged in today by thinkers like
Francis Fukuyama and other proponents of a morally serious sociobiology, to fully
integrate human beings into the goods of the biological world. For they recognize
that ultimately human beings naturally desire a good that transcends the finitude of
the biological world and therefore that we can only ever be, as Lawler puts it,
"ambiguously at home" in the world. Their thought thus seeks to humanize and
transcend the realm of mere human biology by incorporating it into the spiritual
realm ofreason-to view the various goods ofhuman life in light of the high and
not the low. That it is necessary to give this kind of account of the ultimate goods
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sought in human life, as natural law thinkers like Lawler remind us, is in fact the
"strange truth about our souls."

Conclusion
To different degrees, the Thomistic political reflections of George and Lawler both
draw attention to the problem that American democracy currently has with
maintaining the kind of ordered liberty it needs for its health and survival. This
problem is not new. For more than forty years, political thinkers increasingly have
spoken about this "crisis" in liberal democracy. And yet as Lawler shows, this
problem cannot, in the final analysis, simply be reduced to an epiphenomenon of
the liberationist doctrines of the 1960s. Rather, it is a problem that plagues and will
continue to plague liberal democracy because it feeds off of the very idea of human
life and ofhuman freedom that philosophic liberalism so powerfully articulates and
defends.
How, then, we may ask, should Thomistic political science respond to this
political and philosophical challenge? I would suggest that the only way that
Thomism can really address this problem is by articulating the kind of realist
anthropology and epistemology that Lawler advocates and by defending an account
of the moral and spiritual goods of humanity that is rooted in natural law thinking.
By providing a perspective that ultimately transcends the political and
anthropological limits of philosophical liberalism, Thomistic political thought is
capable both of praising the virtues of liberal democracy and moderating its, at
times, dehumanizing excesses. But this is only possible as long as Thomistic
political thought is willing to think seriously and philosophically about the basic
relation of liberal democracy and Christianity. Only then is Thomism capable of
showing why genuine human liberty must be ordered liberty. Only then is Thomism
capable of showing that human beings are much more than the asocial, comfortseeking, contractualizing beings that philosophic liberalism claims they are. In other
words, Thomism can aid liberal democracy only if it is willing, as Lawler points
out, to defend the truth of Christianity's teaching on the ambiguous nature of human
beings.
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